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Book Reviews
Strategy & Policy in the Middle East
Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of
Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East
By William C. Taylor
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College
The actions of Arab military leadership were overwhelmingly important during the recent “Arab Spring” uprisings, though they receive less
scrutiny than they deserve. The narratives of these struggles are usually
dominated by imagery of young people standing up to regime police and
hired thugs or outmaneuvering them with social media. These aspects
of the uprisings are clearly more dramatic than military officers making
careful calculations before choosing a side, but the latter activities were
equally important to the outcomes of the crises. William C. Taylor has
correspondingly helped to fill an important gap by considering the role
of national militaries in the Arab uprisings. In particular, the military
leadership of all these countries had to decide whether they would remain
loyal to their governments or side with the protesters. Such high-stakes
decisions were not always easy.
The case studies employed in this work are Tunisia, Syria, Egypt,
and Libya. The author also occasionally mentions the unrest in Bahrain
and Yemen, though these countries are not addressed in any comprehensive manner. Taylor’s work is enriched by his clear expertise on the
history and structure of the Arab militaries central to his case studies.
Sometimes the author’s major points get a bit lost in the details, but in
general Taylor’s methodical approach allows one to understand a great
deal about military decision-making in each country. This work uses the
concepts of interests and restraints to help define military leadership
behavior. Essentially, this means the military leaders had to define their
corporate interests during the uprisings and then ask themselves what
they were capable of doing to influence the outcome of the struggle.
They then had to decide when and if they should take strong actions.
No military leader wants to be out front of a revolution that fizzles, but
neither do they wish to go down with an unpopular regime.
Unsurprisingly, Arab militaries did not respond uniformly to the
crises in their countries. In Tunisia, where the first uprising broke out,
the police and other security forces were the dictatorship’s first line
of defense. The security units’ vanguard status allowed the military
to remain on the sidelines while internal security forces struggled to
defeat angry protestors, often using deadly force. Tunisia’s army, which
had been treated poorly by the dictator, had little incentive to fight for
the regime and carefully gauged the progress of the protestors in their
struggle against the detested government. When Tunisian dictator Zein
al Abidine Ben Ali finally ordered General Rashid Ammar, chief of the
Tunisian Armed Forces, to support faltering regime loyalists, the general
refused to do so and told the dictator that he was “finished.” This was
checkmate, and Ben Ali quickly fled the country to seek asylum abroad.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, the military dramatically improved
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its position within Tunisia’s leadership structure at the expense of the
pampered and arrogant security forces. General Ammar was declared a
hero of the revolution.
In Egypt, pre-revolutionary circumstances were dramatically different. The military had lost a great deal of its political influence, but this
change did not mean it had given up its considerable economic assets
across the country or its respected role in society. Nevertheless, many
officers were at least somewhat unhappy with the regime and especially
with the idea that President Mubarak was grooming his son, Gamal, to
succeed him as president. Gamal had never served in the military and was
often seen as the vehicle for extending the life of a failing government
system that could not continue indefinitely. After the uprising spread
to Egypt from Tunisia, Mubarak refused to rule out the possibility his
son would run for president until almost the last minute when such
promises were viewed as desperate and insincere. Neither Taylor nor any
other author is likely to establish the precise role of Gamal’s potential
succession in pushing the military away from the regime, but it may
have been highly significant. Taylor also notes the military remained
neutral for quite some time, balancing statements about people’s legitimate rights with assertions that looting and criminality would not be
tolerated. When it became clear the protestors were gaining the upper
hand and the army’s inaction was threatening its interests, they decided
to remove Mubarak.
If the Arab Spring’s changes of governments in Tunisia and Egypt
were relatively rapid and decisive, events occurred in an almost totally
opposite manner in Syria. In the years prior to the Assad family rule,
Syria was notoriously prone to military coups. This situation changed
after 1970 when the first Assad regime (under the current president’s
father) began. Under both Assads, every effort was made to “coup
proof” the regime, which ruled largely by fear and was structured to
crush any internal revolt. When a March 2011 uprising occurred in
Syria, the regime had both the tools and the will to respond with overwhelming brutality. In Syria, the military leadership was dominated by
members of President Assad’s Alawite religious minority who, displayed
“fervent support for the regime policies,” fearing unyielding revenge
if their sect and its allies ever relinquished the levers of power. Spikes
in government brutality led to new defections among Sunni soldiers,
but enough of the military remained loyal, or intimidated, to prevent
regime defeat. Although the Assad regime offered limited concessions
to the protesters, it relied more heavily upon its security services and the
military to implement a policy of unrestrained and indiscriminant use of
force. The policies have so far allowed the regime to survive.
The Libyan military was different from the other armed services
considered in Taylor’s study due to its lack of cohesive leadership with a
strong corporate identity. Taylor notes Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi,
had previously faced a number of coup attempts and therefore treated
the armed forces with tremendous distrust. Officers were retained and
promoted almost entirely on the issue of loyalty and the ranks were filled
with informants and “people’s commissars.” Libya maintained a deeply
unprofessional and demoralized military that was starved of resources
except for the elite units. Regime security was provided by the security
services, African mercenaries, and elite military units often under the
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command of Qadhafi family members. Thus when faced with a popular
uprising against the regime the military fractured. Elite and mercenary
units remained loyal to the dictator, while many within the neglected,
non-elite forces eventually sided with the revolutionaries. Sometimes
the non-elite forces remained non-committal until the revolutionaries seemed to have a good chance of overthrowing the dictator. The
NATO decision to use airpower to support the revolutionaries naturally
increased the willingness of waverers to commit to the rebels, ensuring
Qadhafi’s defeat and leading to his death.
The final two chapters in this work concern US and other Western
efforts to influence Arab militaries through programs such as the
International Military Training and Education Program (IMET).
Taylor maintains that previous officer involvement with IMET, Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and other interactions with Western militaries had
almost no effect on Arab military decision-making during the uprisings. Likewise many leaders with long exposure to the West (including
London-educated Bashar Assad) showed no inclination to favor democratic values during times of crisis. Taylor states IMET has value for a
variety of reasons such as improving communications between US forces
and other militaries, supporting coalition-building, and familiarizing
allies and potential allies with US military doctrine, but not socializing
foreign officers to American values to the point they based their most
important decisions on such considerations. Rather, Arab officers in the
Arab Spring acted primarily on the basis of cost-benefit considerations
and corporate identity. Taylor further supports his conclusions with a
limited amount of survey research of officers and soldiers who have
participated in US-sponsored training and military education or other
forms of exposure to the West. While his conclusion that military organizations act in their own interests is not very surprising, he usefully
discredits views that Arab military cravings for US-style democracy
were a key motivating force for their actions during the uprisings.

America’s Challenges in the Greater Middle East: The Obama
Administration’s Policies
Edited by Shahram Akbarzadeh
Reviewed by Colonel Robert E. Friedenberg, Levant Division Chief, J-5, Deputy
Directorate of Middle East, Joint Staff and former US Senior Defense Official
and Defense Attaché to Syria.

P

resident Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo on June 4 2009 described
seven sources of tension between the United States and the Islamic
World. In an attempt to draw a distinction between his and the previous
administration, he declared that extremism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iran, democracy, religious freedom, women’s rights and economic
development were mutual interests that must be addressed so Muslim
countries and the United States to forge a new relationship after the
9/11 attacks and the wars in Iraq can Afghanistan. Only two years later,
democracy and economic development in the Middle East came to the
forefront when a young fruit vendor in Tunisia set himself on fire to
protest the lack of either in his country. His death set off a chain of
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events that has impacted the Middle East more than any other single
event since the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
President Obama’s Cairo speech is a theme that winds its way
through America’s Challenges in the Greater Middle East. Every chapter,
from Shahram Akbarzadeh’s introduction, through those on Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Israel and Palestine, to the Maghreb, Iran, Pakistan
and Afghanistan, all deal with President Obama’s attempt to distance
himself from the previous administration and to reestablish a positive
relationship with the Islamic Middle East.
Unfortunately, the book was published in 2011, before two events
that would shape the Obama administration’s relationship with the Arab
world: the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring, and the attempt to
re-draw America’s relationship with Iran. From the vantage point of late
2014, this book is dated. The chapters on Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt all go to great lengths to describe the folly of the Bush administration’s attempt to force democracy on Arab governments – and Obama’s
attempts to walk Bush’s “democracy-first” policy back and emphasize
non-intervention in internal governance. The interventions in Libya, the
post-Morsi Egypt policy, and in Iraq and Syria showed events in the
Middle East continue to force the Obama administration to stay active
in the region and engage these governments in their internal affairs.
Another theme running through the book is how the actions of
the Bush administration resulted in a loss of US credibility with Arab
governments and their populations. The Cairo speech was to be the first
attempt to repair that credibility. It is true that Obama has not been as
close to Israel as the previous two administrations, but his administration is seen by Arabs as ineffective in keeping Israel from building new
settlements and prosecuting war on Palestinians. Additionally, Sunni
Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia now believe the Obama administration may be abandoning them in pursuit of what they consider is an
ill-advised détente with Iran.
Most of the book’s chapters simply focus on criticizing the Bush
administration and lauding Obama. Chapters on Saudi Arabia, Israel and
Iran focus on Bush-era mistakes and hope for Obama’s success. However,
in other chapters, there is some diversity and insight. Written just after
the fall of Mubarak, Michele Dunne’s chapter on Egypt recognizes the
military junta that replaced him is not the end of the story; “Egypt’s
transition will unfold over years, not months.” A balanced chapter on
Pakistan written by Touqir Hussain recognizes Pakistan is contributing to the fight against extremism but at the same time undermining it
with its support of extremists in Afghanistan and India. William Maley’s
chapter on Afghanistan cautions against using the number of US troops
on the ground as a metric for stability.
The danger of books written about this turbulent region is they
can become obsolete very quickly. Many books written subsequent to
America’s Challenges in the Greater Middle East will be more relevant and
insightful to those interested in US Middle East policy. But given everything that has transpired since the book was published, Akbarzadeh’s
introduction contains an extremely prescient paragraph. He writes that
unlike Bush, Obama’s approach is seeking not to implement change in
the Middle East, but to manage the existing situation. Akbarzadeh then

Book Reviews: Strategy & Policy in the Middle East

153

wonders if such an approach “further undermines the United States’
standing in the Middle East.” Given the frustration apparent from many
Middle Eastern governments over the Obama administration’s lack of
action against the Assad regime in Syria and its halting intervention
against the Islamic State in Iraq, one wonders if in some corners of
the region, there is a wistful longing for the interventionist days of his
predecessor.
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Strategy & Nuclear War
The Permanent Crisis: Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory
By Shashank Joshi
Reviewed by Christopher J. Bolan, PhD, Professor of National Security Studies,
US Army War College

T
Whitehall, London, UK:
Royal United Services
Institute, 2012
160 pages
$25.00

he author is a young and talented scholar writing from the Royal
United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. This relatively brief
and clearly written analysis does an admirable job of placing Iran’s
nuclear activities into a broader regional and historic context, which is
useful background for anyone interested in making informed judgments
about the way ahead for US policy. This book has the added advantage of
being organized into stand-alone chapters enabling readers to consume
its insights offered efficiently.
The first substantive section “How We Got Here, and Where We
Stand” ably summarizes the historical context informing and influencing
contemporary policy debates over how best to deal with Iran’s growing
nuclear capabilities. Those familiar with this history can skim or skip
this chapter entirely, but newcomers will benefit tremendously from this
background. Particularly relevant is his examination of at least a “partial
convergence of American and Iranian interests” on regional issues in
the immediate wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Perhaps surprising for
many, Shashank notes the degree of active US-Iranian cooperation in
these early days of the war against terrorism. The Iranian military was
actively supporting the efforts of both the CIA and US Special Forces
to supply the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Iranian diplomats
facilitated successful US negotiations leading to the Bonn Agreement
in 2001, and the establishment of a transitional national government in
Afghanistan. Moreover, Iranian officials had gone so far as to extend
an offer “to work under US command to assist in building the Afghan
National Army.” US policymakers debating Iran policy should remember the United States and Iran continue to share many of these same
interests today in battling violent Sunni extremist groups and in fostering stability in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Shashank also correctly observes prospects for building on these
limited successes virtually collapsed with President George W. Bush’s
inclusion of Iran in his “axis of evil” reference in his 2002 State of the
Union Address and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Shashank
also astutely tracks domestic political developments remarking the rise
of increasingly conservative elements in both Tehran (Ahmadinejad) and
Washington (neoconservatives) served to heighten “mutual US-Iranian
threat perceptions” and seriously undermined prospects for a negotiated solution. He also notes these trends have more recently reversed
with the election of President Obama and President Rouhani. Both have
expressed their determination to explore a negotiated solution over the
extent of Iran’s nuclear programs.
The next chapter, “Policy Today,” charts the evolving negotiating
positions of the Western powers and Iran. Although many “experts”
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might be tempted to ignore this fairly uncontentious history, Shashank
offers some discerning reminders useful for contemporary policymakers. In particular, he tracks the relative weakening of Western negotiating
positions over time. He notes the West has long insisted on the unrealistic goal of eliminating all Iranian enrichment activities. In the absence
of a negotiated solution, however, Iran has proceeded with the creation
of new “facts on the ground,” adding to its existing nuclear capabilities
and effectively providing “new areas of bargaining leverage.” Shashank
also briefly covers the risks of a strategy reliant on military strikes
against Iranian nuclear facilities – the obvious alternative should a
strategy grounded in sanctions or negotiations fail. More importantly
though he makes a strong case for defining the essential objectives of a
negotiated solution from a Western perspective, namely, extending the
potential breakout time for an Iranian nuclear weapon and strengthen
the international inspections regime in Iran.
The third major chapter, “The Implications of a Nuclear Iran,”
should be read by novice and expert alike. Here Shashank is at his best
in carefully examining contrasting viewpoints of the potential dangers
of a nuclear-armed Iran while downplaying some of the more alarmist
concerns. For example, he convincingly dismisses arguments that Iran is
an irrational actor. He explains Iranian leaders are subject to traditional
cost-benefit calculations which means even a nuclear-armed Iran could
be effectively constrained by more traditional strategies of containment
and deterrence. He examines the broader history of nuclear proliferation in Asia and concludes an Iranian nuclear weapons capability need
not necessarily spur further regional proliferation. He also persuasively
argues nuclear weapons will have only limited utility to leaders in Tehran
– primarily as a deterrent to foreign military interventions aimed at
regime change. Finally, he suggests US policymakers would be wise to
begin working with Iran now to strengthen nuclear safety mechanisms.
Effective controls over these nuclear-related activities will serve both
Western and Iranian interests even should Iran eventually develop a
nuclear weapon.
The most significant shortfall of this book is the 2012 copyright.
Readers will have to refer to newspaper accounts and recent think-tank
papers to fill in the gap covering important developments since then.

On Limited Nuclear War In the 21st Century
By Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, editors
Reviewed by Rebecca Davis Gibbons, PhD candidate in International Relations
at Georgetown University

C

onsider for a moment that in 2015 a single nuclear weapon has just
been detonated in anger. Where did the explosion occur? What
actors were involved? What was the goal of such a limited use of nuclear
arms? Was this a demonstration shot, a limited counterforce strike, or
perhaps an attack intended to terminate a conventional conflict?
The twelve authors in the volume On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st
Century, edited by Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, want policy-makers to consider and plan for such possibilities. With increasing
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tensions and opportunities for miscalculation in the South China Sea,
a growing North Korean arsenal, unclear Iranian intentions surrounding nuclear weapons, and President Vladimir Putin posting video of
himself practicing the launch of Russian strategic forces on YouTube,
the authors are correct to argue that the likelihood of nuclear use may
be increasing.
In his foreword to the book, the late Nobel-prize winner Thomas
Schelling praises this effort to encourage deeper thinking about nuclear
use in the present day: “This book is the only one I know that can
induce national leaders, or their advisers, to take seriously the prospect
of minimizing mutual damage in a nuclear war.”
In twelve distinct and diverse chapters, the authors consider the
theory, practice, and implications of limited nuclear war. In contrast to
the all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet
Union feared during the Cold War, limited war is defined by the authors
as nuclear conflict restrained along one or more of five possible dimensions: numbers of nuclear weapons used, scope of the area affected, the
duration of use, political objectives of use, and the targeting plan.
The volume is divided into three sections. The first, “Assessing the
History of the Cold War,” examines the history and theory of limited
war from the Cold War to the present. Those seeking to examine the
chapters focused especially on the concept of limited war should read
Andrew Ross’s comprehensive chapter on limited war theory in this
section.
The second section, “Managing the Risk of Nuclear War in the 21st
Century,” provides considerations for how limited nuclear war could
occur today. Paul Bernstein summarizes the capabilities and interests of
actors most likely to be involved in future nuclear war, while Thomas
Mahnken provides five scenarios for potential future limited nuclear
use. Such scenario-based thinking surrounding limited war is needed,
but any grouping of five potential scenarios risks being both too narrow
and far-fetched to readers. Instead, this middle section could have been
improved with a chapter exclusively focused on the various theoretical
bases for how nuclear weapons might come to be used in the future and
then adding accompanying real-life scenarios for each theory. Theories
of use are interspersed throughout the book (e.g., demonstration shots
in crisis, use for war termination, etc.) but a chapter dedicated to
defining a typology of employment would have been helpful for considering the scope of possible use and policy-options for addressing such
contingencies.
This middle section also includes a chapter by George Quester on
the nuclear taboo and how the sixty-five-year pattern of non-use could
be disrupted. Quester touches on the need for the United States to
consider how to reestablish this pattern, or tradition, after nuclear use.
Greater consideration of this topic would also benefit US policy-makers.
After an instance of nuclear use the United States and its allies will have
to think quickly through how to ensure the initial nuclear use is not perceived as beneficial for the attacker. In other words, how will the United
States work to send the message that nuclear use does not pay? This
question is also one in which scenario planning would be beneficial.
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The final section, “Confronting the Challenges of Nuclear War
in the 21st Century,” includes a useful chapter in which Bruce Blair
provides a net assessment of US capabilities for engaging in a limited
nuclear war, noting areas where US capabilities may need to adapt.
Although there are many well-researched and thought-provoking
chapters in this volume, a complete reading of the entire volume will
provide the reader with a valuable tutorial on a breadth of topics related
to limited nuclear use. Most importantly, perhaps, the book instills an
appreciation of the great and sometimes contradictory nuclear challenges facing the United States today: reducing the salience of nuclear
weapons in a world where the relevance is increasing for some actors,
while maintaining a nuclear arsenal credible to allies and adversaries
alike.

Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the
Ultimate Weapon
By Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, editors
Reviewed by Bradley A. Thayer, University of Iceland/Háskóla Íslands

O

nce in a while a work comes along that is a pleasure to review due
to the importance of its argument. Toshi Yoshihara and James
Holmes have brought together an essential collection of essays centered
on the consequences of nuclear proliferation, with an emphasis on East
and South Asia. The work makes two broad arguments. First, the world
has entered what Paul Bracken termed the “Second Nuclear Age,” where
proliferation has moved beyond the transatlantic environment to Asia.
While there are similarities with deterrence during the Cold War, this
second age promises greater complexity due to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to more states, and to the connection between nuclear
weapons and the power and ambition of states in East and South Asia.
Second, the authors evaluate how the Second Nuclear Age impacts the
nuclear strategies of China, India, Iran, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan,
and South Africa. Here is where the book makes a detailed, thoughtful,
and significant contribution.
In this short review, it is not possible to give each chapter the attention deserved. Readers may be assured all chapters are well executed
and insightful. Given constraints, I will only consider two. The first is
by Christopher Yeaw, Andrew Erickson, and Michael Chase on China’s
strategic doctrine. This chapter well captures the evolution of Chinese
nuclear strategy from the Maoist period until today. In a masterful analysis, the authors consider Chinese nuclear doctrine and the growth in
the Chinese arsenal. They argue, first, that China is moving away from
a “minimum deterrence” posture that defined its strategy since 1964.
Beijing is moving toward a larger, more diverse second-strike posture
and one in which the nuclear deterrence mission is incorporated with
conventional missile force strike operations. Second, this posture is a
cause of great concern in Asia and to the United States and could lead
to instability in a confrontation with the United States. This is because
Chinese thought on crisis behavior may promote risky and dangerous
actions. In this respect, a danger faced in the Cold War might be worse
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today because the actions China takes to deter might cause escalation.
The chapter is concise but rich in evaluation of China’s strategic forces,
doctrine and training; hence it should inform analyses of China’s strategic direction.
The second chapter is by the editors themselves. Holmes and
Yoshihara advance a useful thought experiment on why and how Japan
would go nuclear. While this concern was important in the “First Nuclear
Age,” is has greater resonance in the “Second.” This change is due to the
growth in Chinese power and its consequences, particularly for power
projection. For Tokyo, this possibility means thinking through the “day
after Taiwan.” It is also due to the reduced US conventional force structure in the region, particularly regarding the size of the Pacific fleet.
While Holmes and Yoshihara do not see a nuclear Japan as especially
likely, they first review possible Japanese motives to do so; second, the
prospect of Japanese “nuclear hedging;” third, the technical feasibility
of a rapid Japanese breakout; fourth, they review possible force structures and strategies available to Japan before considering an agenda for
future research. One of their most insightful conclusions is if Japan were
to acquire nuclear weapons, it would likely do so in slow motion. The
chapter is a model of a policy-relevant thought experiment.
The study is well balanced and the authors cover their topics concisely.
Yoshihara and Holmes’ conclusions neatly underscore the importance of
strategy and many of the dangers faced by the United States and the
other parties in the region. The study is an excellent contribution and
will remain as a useful prism through which to understanding nuclear
proliferation, its consequences, and nuclear developments in South and
East Asia.

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear
Disarmament and Nonproliferation
By Harold A. Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Frank N.
Von Hippel
Reviewed by Ward Wilson, award winning writer and scholar, director of the
Rethinking Nuclear Weapons project, and a Senior Fellow at British American
Security Information Council (BASIC)
Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 2014
291 pages
$30.00

U

nmaking the Bomb is a book by renowned experts that ably summarizes the current situation with respect to fissile materials and
suggests practical steps to “unmaking” the bomb and ensuring that it
stays unmade.
Dwight D. Eisenhower believed a nation’s industrial capacity was
the key to victory in war.
The faculty of the Army War College—many of them veterans of the
Great War—drummed this basic point into the heads of Eisenhower and
his classmates. ‘War today involves the whole nation’, they emphasized.
Most fundamental, military power is ultimately the reflection of a nation’s
industrial mobilization potential.1

1      Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower
and the Thermonuclear Revolution,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since
1945 by John Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, and Jonathan Rosenberg.
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A state’s capacity to make war is of strategic significance. The army
of the United States may have been small in 1939 (just behind Portugal),
but that did not reflect the United States’ actual strength. Once war
began, the United States military became one of the pre-eminent fighting machines of the 20th century.
The authors of Unmaking the Bomb share a similar outlook with
Eisenhower when looking at the problem of nuclear weapons. They see
capacity as the crucial element in the problem, rather than numbers.
Disarmament has often involved obsessing over how many nuclear
missiles and nuclear warheads are in active service. Given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons this question is important. But in the long
run, it is also important to focus on the larger question of national
capacity. Unmaking the Bomb focuses on the process behind all those
warheads—the capacity that underlies an arsenal.
Unmaking the Bomb presents, in careful and meticulous detail, a
persuasive case that the best way to deal with nuclear weapons, over
the coming years, is to tackle the fissile materials problem. After all, as
the authors point out, the most difficult part of the process of building
nuclear weapons is the refining and enrichment of the materials needed
to make the explosive: fissile materials. These materials are, therefore,
a “choke point” in the process of making nuclear weapons. Why build
a dam where a river is widest when it is much easier to stop the flow by
damming it where it is narrowest? In thinking about whether it would
be feasible to eliminate the world’s arsenals of nuclear weapons, the
authors argue, persuasively, that fissile materials are the key. Unmaking
the Bomb summarizes the existing situation, explains the technology and
science behind the various options for producing fissile materials, and
talks straightforwardly about how a path could be charted to a world in
which nuclear weaponry could be effectively—and verily—eliminated.
The narration is a model of clarity, which is particularly impressive
for a book that involves so much physics and so many sophisticated
manufacturing issues. The four authors represent a remarkable collection of expertise in the field. Drawn from the Program on Science
and Global Security at Princeton University, all have worked on these
problems for more than 20 years and two of them have been internationally acknowledged experts in the field for much longer. The solid factual
content of the book and its sober tone accurately reflect the attitude
of the authors; this serious problem can only be resolved with careful
thinking, meticulous scholarship, and realistic appraisals of facts on the
ground.
The book opens with a brief overview of the history of nuclear
weapons followed by the less well known history of producing fissile
materials. The authors detail current international stockpiles of fissile
materials, explain key links in the connection between nuclear power
and nuclear weapons and the steps necessary to ensure that fissile materials are not diverted from commercial nuclear power plants. Looking
forward, they explore how it would be possible to end the separating of
plutonium and the use of high enriched uranium (HEU) for reactor fuel.
In the third and final section of the book, they map out reasonable steps
for ending production of fissile materials for weapons and disposing of
existing stocks of fissile materials.
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One of the book’s great strengths is its many graphs. Collecting and
visually representing data is much harder than it seems and the tables
and graphs in this volume are models of careful, clear presentation. It’s a
relief to read a book about nuclear weapons where exaggeration, histrionics, and moralizing play no role. It is the sober and serious examination
of policy where American scholars once excelled.
If you want to understand the facts about fissile materials and how
they might sensibly be controlled and eventually eliminated, there is
simply no better source.
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Military Ethics
The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare:
Achilles Goes Asymmetrical
By Pauline M. Kaurin
Reviewed by Sibylle Scheipers, PhD, senior lecturer in international relations at
the University of St. Andrews

I

n The Warrior, Military Ethics and Contemporary Warfare, Pauline M. Kaurin
sets out to devise a new approach to thinking about military ethics and,
crucially, to teaching it to cadets and soldiers. Her basic assumption, and
hence the rationale of the book, contemporary warfare is “asymmetric”
and the moral approach to fighting it has to be adapted to this condition
of asymmetry. The book covers a number of specific pertinent issues
such as the question of the moral and legal equality of combatants, drone
warfare and non-lethal weapons (though it is not entirely clear why those
two are covered in the same chapter, given their moral implications are
vastly different), and the application of the law of armed conflict in
humanitarian interventions.
This book is well intentioned, but deeply flawed. Weaknesses include
sloppy editing, lack of attention to the details of its presentation, weak
positioning of the main arguments in the context of pertinent research
literature, and, most importantly, a shaky foundation within the framework of the over-hyped, but analytically feeble concept of “asymmetric
warfare.”
A few words on the presentation, before I turn to the more substantial problems: parts of the text are littered with typos, names of
referenced authors are misspelled (Samuel Huntington is introduced as
Huntingdon), and the text suffers from over-capitalization (“Military
Professionalism,” “Utilitarianism,” “Justice”). At times, the author’s
somewhat colloquial style sits uneasily with the complexity of the topic
(“What this really boils down to [23];” “At the end of the day [134]”).
The text is filled with a dizzying number of acronyms (the “don’t ask,
don’t tell” policy is shortened to “DADT [91]”) – but there is no list of
abbreviations included.
The book’s bibliography is a mere three and a half pages long. It
does reference major names in the field, but the author is oblivious to
others. Mark Osiel, for instance, has presented an important argument
on reciprocity and post-reciprocal military ethics, which speaks to many
of the central issues which Kaurin is wrestling; yet, his book is conspicuously absent from the bibliography.1 Kaurin also devotes a whole
chapter to the reformulation of the distinction between combatants and
civilians, in which she opts for a broadening of the range of categories
from clear-cut combatants to vulnerable civilians and claims this is
underpinned by “actual field practice in recent conflicts.” However, she
fails to mention the International Committee of the Red Cross’ study on
1      Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture, and the Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).
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direct participation in hostilities, which addresses precisely this issue.2
More importantly, the latter suggests a completely different approach,
which upholds the dichotomy between combatants and civilians, but
introduces temporary suspensions of civilian protections for those civilians who take up arms. This error is bound to lead to confusion at best
(and criminal liability at worst) for those who are at the receiving end of
the teaching of military ethics.
The deepest flaw of the book is its insufficient conceptual grounding
in the idea of asymmetric warfare. Kaurin discusses critical assessments
of the concept of asymmetric warfare. Unfortunately, she comes up
with a definition that turns out to be impractical: “In other words, I see
asymmetrical warfare (especially the contemporary version of it) as an
attempt to alter the discourse and ground rules about what constitutes
war, how it is to be waged and what counts as success or failure (9).”
This definition would have also applied to contemporary perceptions
of Napoleonic warfare, but surely this is not what Kaurin had in mind.
What remains, then, is a well-intentioned attempt to popularize the
teaching of military ethics, which is indeed a worthwhile and oftenneglected topic at staff colleges around the world. The parts in which
Kaurin discusses the way moral problems should be debated are the
best ones in the book, and often guided by good intuitions, for instance
Kaurin’s warning that penalizing those who take up arms unlawfully
could have negative moral and strategic implications. However, these
insights are not grounded in the conceptual basis of the book. On the
contrary, Kaurin’s repeated talk of “moral asymmetry” as the most
basic feature of asymmetric warfare make them seem surprising, if not
unconvincing.

The Morality of Private War. The Challenge of Private Military
and Security Companies.
By James Pattison
Reviewed by Birthe Anders, Teaching Fellow in the Department of War
Studies, King’s College London

Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2014
272 pages
$82.50

S

cholars in war studies have long been concerned whether Private
Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are morally reprehensible
and undermine the democratic control of military force — in effect,
whether the companies are nothing more than modern-day mercenaries.
James Pattison’s The Morality of Private War tackles these questions in a
very comprehensive and thorough way. The short answer is, from a moral
point of view, PMSCs should not be used. The longer answer is much
more complex.
Pattison, a professor of politics at the University of Manchester,
examines PMSCs, their employees, and their clients through the lens
of Just War Theory. The book is structured in four parts: addressing individuals, the employment of PMSCs by states and alternative
arrangements of military force, as well as the companies’ effect on the
2      Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law (Geneva: ICRC, 2009).
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international system. In the final part of the book, the author summarizes by whom and in which roles PMSCs can be used, assesses the state
of current regulation and proposes how military force should ideally be
organized, namely, through a global monopoly on military force. This
review can only provide a brief synopsis of this very dense book and
highlight crucial points in Pattison’s argument.
Central to the author’s analysis is what he calls the Cumulative
Legitimacy Approach, by which the legitimacy of the military can be
assessed. Pattison argues prominent theories of civil-military relations
(those of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver) do not adequately address
the morality of force. According to the Cumulative Legitimacy Approach
four factors determine legitimacy; Effectiveness, Democratic Control,
Proper Treatment of Military Personnel, and Communal Bonds. These
features are scalar and cumulative. Thus, not doing well on one of the
criterion, can to some extent, be ameliorated by doing well on the others.
Legitimacy here means how effective an agent (the military as well as
PMSCs) is in promoting basic human rights and fighting just wars.
In the first part of the book, the author focusses on individual contractors and asks whether it is permissible to be a contractor, meaning
whether it is allowed under just war and human rights criteria. Pattison
rightly observes one of the most prominent objections to private military force is that PMSCs and their employees are mercenaries because
they are (at least partially) motivated by financial gain. The author contests this objection and poses two questions not usually addressed in
the literature: (a) would it actually be problematic if an individual was
primarily motivated by financial gain, and (b) is that more likely to be
the case for a contractor than for a soldier?
Pattison finds contractors are indeed more likely than soldiers to
be primarily motivated by financial gain. Perhaps not a very surprising find, but what follows is interesting. In contrast to the dominant
interpretation of this argument the author finds financial motives are
not necessarily a major objection to private force. It can be permissible
to be a contractor, even if part of one’s motivation is financial gain.
However, it cannot be the dominant motivation. The next section goes
on to examine when it is permissible to be a contractor. Here, individual
jus ad bellum and jus in bello need to be followed. These are same principles
determining just wars for states, inter alia just cause, last resort, legitimate
authority, and proportionality. It should be noted that Pattison’s analysis
is a theoretical one without looking at new data, which means novices to
such detailed legal analyses might find the book a bit dry and tedious to
read. However, if you have a taste for this kind of book, the detail and
thoroughness are very enjoyable.
What could be an alternative to PMSCs? As Pattison examines in
the second part of the book, contractors are not the only ones facing
moral problems, state forces do as well. The all-volunteer force (AVF)
is the preferable arrangement of the military as conscription faces a
number of moral problems. One example is the restriction of individual
autonomy. In part three of the book, the author broadens the level of
analysis from individuals and companies to the international system
and analyzes several ways in which the use of PMSCs negatively affects
the stability of the international system. Readers might think problems
with PMSCs identified in the first three parts of the book could be
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alleviated by tighter and more effective regulation. Pattison considers
this problem in his final chapter and summarizes existing regulations at
the international and national level as well as self-regulation. He rightly
points to the patchy nature of current regulation as well as to difficulties
of overseeing and enforcing self-regulation by the industry.
One could also argue the answer to the question of whether it is
permissible to work for a PMSC, or employ one, depends on the type of
service required; logistical support services differ from armed security
work. A minor flaw of the book is its sweeping use of the terms private
war and private force and its focus on potential combat roles of PMSCs.
While the author acknowledges PMSCs offer a variety of services (on
a spectrum from logistics to armed security to combat), it has actually been many years since PMSCs were last hired by a state for direct
combat.
Ultimately, the problems with private and public military force laid
out in the first three parts of the book can only be solved by establishing
a global public monopoly on the authorization and provision of military
force. Pattison proposes a reformed UN and especially a restructured
Department of Peacekeeping Operations be put in charge of such
a force. It is easy to dismiss this proposal as entirely unrealistic and,
indeed, the author concedes this is a valid objection; but it “…misses
the point. At issue ...is the most morally desirable way of organizing
military force.” Thus, this ideal should be worked towards, even if its
full implementation is unlikely.
Who should read The Morality of Private War? The book should be of
use to anyone with an interest in private military and security companies, military ethics or civil-military relations. It is a welcome addition
to the field of PMSC research, and should especially stimulate debate on
PMSCs’ effect on democratic control of the military and civil-military
relations as well as on future regulations. The author does not offer
much guidance for practitioners already working with PMSCs, but that
is not the aim. He addresses the moral legitimacy of individual contractors, PMSCs and their clients and does it well. The book is a theoretical
analysis of a practical issue, and one that should be read by anyone
working with or for a PMSC.

The Ethics of Interrogation: Professional Responsibility in an
Age of Terror
By Paul Lauritzen.
Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Pryer, author of The Fight for
the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation during Operation Iraqi
Freedom, May 2003 – April 2004.

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2013
227 pages
$26.95

T

he Ethics of Interrogation may sound like a philosophical discussion.
This book is not one. For that, see an earlier book with a strangely
similar title and cover, Michael Sherker’s An Ethics of Interrogation. What
interests Lauritzen is the internal debates of four professions on the
ethics of interrogation and the importance of such debates to our republic during an age of rapidly changing security threats. The result is a
fascinating, albeit flawed, study.
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Lauritzen begins by arguing the social-trustee model of professionals as servants of the public good is largely dead. In its place has
arisen the view of social scientists that professions are “centers of neutral
expertise.” This trend, he says, must be reversed, leading to his thesis: “I
hope to show that the professions are where democratic character traits
may take root and that we need to nurture a view of professionals as
servants of the common good.”
He examines the acrimonious debate within the American
Psychological Association (APA) about the participation of psychologists in interrogations. Soon after 9/11, APA amended its Code of Ethics
to justify this participation, effectively stating members could participate
even in abusive interrogations if these interrogations were legal. This
stance led to a revolt within the ranks that “the dissenters won.” But, he
contends, dissidents have gone too far by trying to keep psychologists
out of interrogations completely, and failing to account for legitimate
national security concerns.
Next, he retells the well-known story of executive branch lawyers
enabling “enhanced” interrogation techniques (EITs). The American
Bar Association’s reaction was an angry one, and the Office for
Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigated the conduct of John Yoo
and Jay Bybee. Lauritzen points out OPR’s inconsistency in failing to
investigate Steven Bradbury when Bradbury later signed memoranda
giving legal cover to an even more expansive list of coercive techniques.
No lawyer was ever disbarred or fined, but Lauritzen believes the legal
profession positively influenced its members’ conduct.
Lauritzen also looks at the torture debate within the medical
profession. While the UN and American Medical Association (AMA)
prohibit medical personnel from certifying the fitness of prisoners for
harmful treatment, US medical personnel conducted such certifications
anyway. The Office of the Surgeon General ignored this unpleasant
fact by defining “participation” as direct participation in interrogations
and then denying medical personnel participated in any interrogations.
Lauritzen does not attribute this to prevarication. Rather, he points to
the tension between the UN’s and AMA’s expansive prohibitions and
“the expectation that physicians will treat detainees in need”—a tension
remaining unresolved.
In subsequent chapters, Lauritzen addresses how professions use
licensing and oversight boards to regulate their members’ behavior and
how virtue theory relates to professions. When discussing the latter, he
holds up the military profession as the exemplar. The military profession’s inculcation of virtues, he argues, is what led the military (that
is, service JAGs) to oppose abusive interrogation tactics, and it would
behoove other professions to follow the military’s example.
This brings us to the book’s flaws, which could be due to the author’s
lack of military experience or research (or both). For one, Lauritzen
fails to consider the large number of officers who embraced “enhanced”
interrogation techniques. Officers commanded Gitmo, Abu Ghraib,
and Bagram. Special mission units routinely employed “enhanced”
interrogation techniques, as did many intelligence units supporting
the conventional army in Afghanistan and Iraq. The fact that so many
officers “bought into” prisoner abuse “to save lives” demonstrates either
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the weakness of the profession’s avowed virtues or the profession’s
real values are something other than advertised. It also undermines
Laurizen’s thesis and the important role of professions in developing
character traits.
Lauritzen also fails to consider the expertise of military interrogators when he asserts “torture works” in producing valuable intelligence.
He offers the example of a true confession (torture almost always produces confessions, true or not) and cites as authoritative an increasingly
discredited figure in the torture debate, Jose Gonzales. Lauritzen seems
unaware of Army doctrine, which has long declared torture to be a poor
and unreliable means of collecting intelligence—a conclusion supported
by the overwhelming evidence of histories and memoirs and, most
recently, the senate report on CIA interrogation practices.
There are other flaws, such as Lauritzen’s unconvincing description
of why some “enhanced” interrogation techniques recognize human
choice and dignity and should be allowed (such as “walling”) and others
do not and should not be allowed (such as “stress positions”). Such flaws
should dissuade professors from choosing this book as a text for impressionable students. Nonetheless, there remains much to commend it to
the mature reader. Lauritzen argues dispassionately, clearly, and fairly (if
not comprehensively), and his research not only informs, it directs the
reader to many of the most important thinkers and works in the torture
debate.

A Generous and Merciful Enemy: Life for German Prisoners of
War during the American Revolution
By Daniel Krebs
Reviewed by MAJ Jason W. Warren, PhD, Concepts and Doctrine Director,
Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, US Army War College

A
Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2013
392 pages
$24.95

nsbach, Germany still displays the colors of its regiments deployed
during the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), and a visitor
to this quaint town in Mittelfranken would not depart thinking that the
Ansbachers were mercenaries. Daniel Krebs, a native German speaker,
in fact claims the term was a misnomer for Germans in British employ
during the war. In his well-crafted “new military history,” A Generous and
Merciful Enemy, Krebs makes excellent use of the extant primary sources
to explore the social aspects of these soldiers’ backgrounds, families,
military experience, and life after combat. In so doing, he relates a story
heretofore marginalized in Anglo-American accounts of the conflict.
This commitment of soldiers by the resource-starved tiny principalities of the Holy Roman Empire—then the sick-man of Europe—was no
small matter. During and immediately after the war, German cultural
elites depicted their princes’ motivations for contributing troops as the
greedy pursuit of a life of debauchery. Later German nationalist writers
derided these rulers as insufficiently German. Krebs counters that the
reality was more nuanced. Sovereigns, in addition to raising money for
domestic projects (often to better their subjects’ condition), also sought
prestige for themselves and their kingdoms; then a not uncommon
objective for royalty. There was also the matter of supporting a British
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king of German ethnicity from the Hanoverian line, and the tradition of
supporting Protestant war efforts, particularly after the Catholic French
and Spanish joined with the American revolutionaries.
Although not all German “subsidy soldiers,” as Krebs refers to
them, were Hessians, “almost the entire Hessen-Kassel army entered
British service” (22) and eventually numbered 20,000 regulars (plus
replacements) during the war. Krebs is able to pattern a mosaic of the
varying American treatment of these soldiers by time and place because
more than 14 percent of all German subsidy soldiers fell into revolutionary hands. Colonial treatment of the Germans even differed within
American states, as Lancaster, Pennsylvania, at first provided generous
conditions, while nearby Reading failed to provide adequate treatment.
In Chapter 4, Krebs uses the topic of handling prisoners as an opportunity to detail how the Western tradition evolved over centuries in matters
of military captivity. He examines how the reality of prisoners’ treatment
on and after the battlefield often ran afoul of the lofty philosophical
ideals of the drawing room.
The American revolutionaries deemed Pennsylvania a sound location for prisoner of war camps because of the German ethnicity of many
of the state’s inhabitants, although major camps also existed in nearby
Maryland, as well as Virginia and Connecticut. Language and ethnicity
mattered during the war with German-American soldiers at Trenton
even enticing the surrender of German subsidy soldiers’ in their native
tongue (97). Indeed, the mix of volunteers, conscripts, and pressed
soldiers in the German ranks often mirrored that of the American
Continental Army and militia units. The topic of similarities between
locales in the early modern era (and beyond) is fertile ground for future
historical focus, and Krebs rightly calls for more military history of the
Atlantic world (25). Kyle Zelner’s A Rabble in Arms is a good example
of a work with similar social-history methodology focusing on the early
colonial period. It details how the Essex County militia of Massachusetts
Bay also consisted of pressed troops a century prior to the arrival of
“Hessians” of the American Revolution.
One point in this solid monograph could use fine-tuning. Krebs
argues the nascent nationalism of the American and French revolutions
turned German “mercenary” troops into anachronisms. The German
troops, therefore, were caught in changing social circumstances, victims
of enlightenment ideals now taken root on the battlefield (32-34). Krebs’
“modern” definition for mercenaries calls for a broader discussion.
Mercenary troops, as contractors in modern-day Iraq and Afghanistan
may readily qualify by his definition.
Instead of looking forward to the French Revolution, Krebs would
have been better served by examining the Thirty Years War, a conflict in
which mercenaries came to be viewed by all sides as a threat to European
civil order. The first truly professional armies since the collapse of Rome
emerged from the destruction of 1618-1648, which saw Ansbach, for
instance, nearly depopulated. Given the devastation and the large-scale
employment of mercenaries, there were no battle standards from this
era preserved in the town. I have spoken with some Ansbachers (one,
a local historian), who trace their ancestry back to Austria, as AustrianGermans repopulated the locale after marauding mercenaries decimated
it. They viewed 1648 as more devastating for the region than 1945. It was
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from this apocalyptic landscape that mercenaries derived a bad name.
With an expanded tactical and operational approach, Krebs might have
established more context for his “subsidy soldiers.” This is a weakness
of the “new military history” which sometimes strays too far from what
scholars have derided as a “drum and bugle” approach. The crucible of
war tells us as much about ourselves in difficult circumstances—and
indeed of humanity itself—no matter how unpleasant the dialogue. It is
within this terrible environment that historians must analyze German
subsidy-soldiers’ behavior. If many German troops in fact acted with
mercenary-like behaviors on the battlefield, as some accounts indicate,
then perhaps the boots fit.
This criticism not withstanding, A Generous and Merciful Enemy is
a much-needed account of a glossed-over American Revolutionary
War topic, and one importantly related from the German perspective.
Krebs’ monograph also includes useful maps depicting little-known
Holy Roman Empire geography, which is part of the outstanding overall
aesthetics of the book. It is an excellent edition to the Campaigns and
Commanders series.
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War & The State
Failed States and the Origins of Violence: A Comparative
Analysis of State Failure as a Root Cause of Terrorism and
Political Violence
By Tiffiany Howard
Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US
Army War College

T

he starting point for the author of Failed States is the lack of scholarly
consensus regarding the origin of terrorists and the lack of quantitative research on the subject. Dr. Howard’s purpose is to remedy the
shortcoming by providing a broadly comparative approach that tests the
extent to which weak and failed states are the impetus for individuals to
engage in political violence. This potentially admirable effort at comparison includes chapters on sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North
Africa, Southeast and South Asia, and Latin America. Howard’s analysis
draws links between state failure and domestic terrorism, and only touches
on the issue of transnational terrorism. The first problem with Howard’s
analysis is, despite drawing on a number of indices of weak and failed
states, her category is applied so expansively it encompasses what in an
earlier era may have been termed simply the “underdeveloped” world.
One example of the dubious application of the term is the characterization of the Philippines as a failing state because, Howard argues, it is
“struggling to develop economically” and is facing internal upheavals.
Howard’s research methodology also suffers from limitations. She
draws on survey data concerning respondents’ views of governance in
their state and the number of people interviewed is small (1200 in each
of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa). One must wonder if the views
recorded are genuinely representative. Perhaps a more serious flaw than
sample size is that some questions did not directly ask about governance,
so the author is forced to use what she terms proxy questions and draw
inferences from them. For example, the survey conducted in the Middle
East and North Africa asks respondents: “In your opinion, which is
the most important problem facing your country today; economic
conditions, corruption, authoritarianism, ending the US occupation
in Iraq, or the Arab-Israeli conflict?” Howard concludes that respondents who view authoritarianism as the most important problem are,
therefore, more likely to support the use of violence against the state
than respondents who chose another answer. Similarly, the survey data
from Latin America asks respondents if social movements are necessary mechanisms for the development of society. Howard’s leap of logic
here concludes that, because social movements are antecedents to social
revolutions, an affirmative answer to the question suggests support for
political violence.
Even granting the validity of the survey data, do the results lead to
a greater understanding of the origins of terrorism and, therefore, prove
useful for national security professionals? In this book, the quantitative
methods validate the obvious, that is, people living in a dangerous environment are likely to support, if not participate, in violence. In fairness
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to the author—she readily admits when the data contradict some of
her hypotheses. For instance, in her discussion of sub-Saharan Africa,
the survey data suggest the perceived presence of the state increases
the probability a person will support violence—which runs contrary
to Howard’s hypothesis that ungoverned spaces provide a haven for
terrorists.
While using quantitative methods to confirm the obvious is
relatively harmless, there remains a greater danger from a more philosophical standpoint. The extent to which quantitative methods can wrap
themselves in the cloak of scientific certainty engenders the risk that
policy-makers, guided by such approaches, will develop such hubris they
will not be able to see or admit errors in judgment. What is missing in
a quantitative approach like Howard’s is the rich historical and cultural
tradition of scholarship found in classic works of comparative politics,
such as Reinhard Bendix’s Kings or People, or Barrington Moore’s, Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, which (despite their flaws) add much
to our understanding of the evolution and change in societies.

State of War: The Political Economy of American Warfare,
1945-2011
By Paul A.C. Koistinen
Reviewed by Isaiah “Ike” Wilson III, Colonel (USA), Chief, Commander’s
Initiative Group (CIG), US Central Command, MacDill AFB

Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2012
328 pages
$39.95

A

s the fifth and final volume of Professor Paul Koistinen’s comprehensive study of the political economy underpinning America’s
wars from colonial beginnings, through the great industrial wars of the
20th century, State of War is literally a tour de force – a walk through our
nation’s comings-of-age as a nation, and after 1945, as a global superpower.
As such, Professor Koistinen (in my view) achieves his intended goal of
“providing a comprehensive, analytical, and interdisciplinary study of
the economics of America’s wars.” Moreover, through his multivolume
study, Professor Koistinen provides us with an essential appreciation for
what is likely the most important factor in understanding the political
economy of America’s state of war and peace: the “political” and power
dynamics define, stress, as well as strengthen and re-define over cycles of
time, the social patterns of American political life.
Koistinen offers three “lenses” through which to view his historical
accounting of the cycles of continuity and change in economic mobilization – each lens is a view into three major stages over the course of
American history, each revealing its own unique “pattern” of economic
mobilization, and identifying four key factors of economic mobilization.
Koistinen’s analysis reveals at least three major insights are particularly
relevant to today’s challenges in rebalancing defense budget stringencies
with current and future national security imperatives. Firstly, Koistinen
shows harnessing the economy for war was more readily accomplished
in the “transitional stage” (1816-1865) than in any other stage. Secondly,
strength of economic and political systems is a determinant in not only
a state’s ability to mobilize a war economy, but bring about success or
defeat. Thirdly, and perhaps the most instructive, if not most worrisome
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of lessons gathered, is over time and through these historical cycles, we
witness a blurring of distinctions between government and industry,
particularly defense industries, feeding and in some instances even creating potentially destructive civil-military imbalances.
President Eisenhower was particularly concerned about three developments: first, the rise of a technological elite; second, an unnecessary
growth of large organizational systems, particularly the integration of
military and business interests, to a degree of integration could cause or
perpetuate international conflict; and third, his concern with technological-military-industrial alliances which were regaining their wartime
ascendancy and were poised to exercise influence out of proportion to
their appropriate role in a peace time democratic society. Eisenhower’s
January 1961 Farewell Address was itself a speech representing a transition between eras. As a warning for the future it was grounded in
Eisenhower’s analysis of mid-century political and cultural currents,
which in turn was based upon his reflections about the momentous
changes occurring during his lifetime – changes Koistinen shows us
perhaps persist as past lessons gathered but unfortunately not yet learned.
The basic problem facing the United States today, in what seems could
be yet another Koistinen “transitional stage” of not merely evolutionary but revolutionary change in political-military and economic affairs,
stems from at least four additional and simultaneous challenges: first, a
growing national debt and debt-to-GDP ratio, which is higher now than
at any time since World War II; second, continued recession with slow
economic recovery; third, an increasingly aging population which will
significantly and persistently increase entitlement costs (Social Security,
Medicaid/Medicare) over the long run, absent entitlement reform;
and fourth, political polarization among policymakers, exacerbated by
compressed timelines for action and pre-election year politics, structurally and procedurally impeding the ability for compromise. Any three
of these would be difficult, but all four problems simultaneously, and
manifest by, and within, a near-perpetual military-industrial complex
(MIC)-driven war economy, are particularly problematic.
As the United States continues into a period of stark fiscal austerity,
policy makers will be required to make hard choices about where best
to spend declining discretionary dollars. Recognizing this as strategic
choice, and understanding the bounds shaping and constraining and
redefining the limits of that choice, is an important insight raised from
Professor Koistinen’s body of work. There is a longstanding American
distaste for tragedy, or rather the want of tragic sensibility (or pragmatism) in our strategic culture has led US strategists and policymakers to
mistake mere force for power. Understanding the difference between
force and power is vital to America’s rise as a durable and balanced
global power, and not merely as a forceful hegemon. This understanding is all the more imperative at a time of compounding global security
challenges and austerity. A renewed American grand strategy would
acknowledge the nation’s tragic flaw: its pride in its force and technology; as Koistinen shows us, a pride flawed in and by the design of a
post-WWII military-industrial, political-economic complex persists. It
would also acknowledge the proximity of this flaw to the nation’s virtue:
the set of principles and institutions for restraining force have proven in
earlier periods uniquely adept at producing abundant prosperity, force,
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and with them unsurpassed power; yet more recently and at present
seem mostly impotent.
There are at least four critical questions raised in the pages of State
of War central to the outcome of the struggle to redefine and resource
American grand strategy. First, how will current political realities affect
the range of strategic choices available to policy makers? Are some
courses of action unrealistic, given the contemporary political climate?
Second, how does the budget interact with and limit our strategy? Given
what we know, or can estimate, regarding the cost of achieving our
objectives, which options are broadly untenable? Third, how can the
United States government make the best possible strategic choices given
our political and budgetary constraints? Are there certain precautions
our government should take to limit or control political influence over
the budget? And if so, who should lead this effort? And finally, the
existing tapestry of US relationships and regional partnerships must be
incorporated into any new or emerging strategic framework, if for no
other reason than to return an economy of scale balance to US force and
defense budget expenditures. What role will these relationships play, and
how should our military forces be structured both to confront new areas
of interest and reassure traditional allies? American global presence
must be calibrated carefully with political and budgetary constraints.
What are our national priorities in the global community, and how can
we organize most effectively to meet our goals?
All of these questions are, finally, questions of grand strategy; they
involve the calculated relation of means to large ends. In this sense, the
fundamental challenge facing the United States might be put this way:
After sixty-five years of pursuing a globally-engaged grand strategy—
nearly a third of which transpired without a great power rival—can the
United States discover a way to navigate this new era of uncertainty
while preserving American dominance as a leading power in, and of, the
international system? These questions will be at the core of our political debates in the years to come. Paul Koistinen’s State of War and his
preceding volumes could not have come to us at a more important time.

Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of
Interstate Violence
By Patricia A. Weitsman
Reviewed by Russ Burgos, Lecturer in Global Studies at UCLA

Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2014
279 pages
$27.95

Allies are the most aggravating of people. They introduce considerations of their own
national politics, none of which have the faintest bearing on the matter of immediate issue
[but] their most annoying characteristic is the astonishing way they seem incapable of
recognizing how sound, how wise, how experienced are our views.”
Diary of Field-Marshal William J. Slim, commander
of the British 14th Army in World War II

I

n Waging War, Patricia A. Weitsman argues our understanding of
what the late military historian Russell Weigley famously called “the
American way of war” needs to be brought into the 21st-century. Weigley
claimed annihilation – destroying the enemy’s armed forces and (ideally)
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occupying his capital – was the basic American strategy in war. While
European great powers hewed closely to the Clausewitzian understanding of war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means – a necessary
limitation for nation-states embedded in a delicate continental balance of
power – the United States approached war as kind of violent intermission to diplomacy: we negotiate, we fight, we negotiate again, making
peace on our terms. Weigley’s thesis cohered nicely with 20th-century
notions of “American Exceptionalism” and strategic unilateralism.
To Weitsman, however, that is its principal weakness: in fact, the
United States doesn’t simply make war (or peace) on its terms. America
is embedded in a network of global alliances, coalitions, and institutions simultaneously enabling and constraining its power. As a result,
Weitsman argues, the American way of war is profoundly multilateral
– profoundly political. “The norm of multilateralism,” she writes, “is
entrenched in the American way of waging war.” This means American
policymakers and strategists must take into consideration the goals,
objectives, and objections of its allies and coalition partners at all stages
of war fighting – compromises can, and often do, frustrate policymakers, public opinion, and even the conduct of America’s wars themselves.
Waging War is not a book about the operational aspects of coalition warfare, though one can glean some insights from Weitsman’s case
studies. Her book is a contribution to scholarly debates about alliances
and coalitions within the international relations and security studies
disciplines and as a result may frustrate those professionally interested
in the operational or political-military dynamics of alliance and coalition
warfare.
Weitsman frames her argument in the context of what she calls
“realist institutionalism,” attempting to bridge the gap between the two
dominant strands of International Relations theorizing – realism, with
its emphasis on interests, and neoliberalism, with its emphasis on formal
and informal international institutions – showing military alliances and
coalitions not only constrain America’s strategic operations in war but
also facilitate the exercising of American hegemonic power across the
globe. Weitsman develops her theory in five case studies, ranging from
the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to NATO’s Kosovo and
Libya interventions, emphasizing the political history of the alliance, its
decision-making structure, the intra-alliance distribution of power, its
size, its war-fighting effectiveness, and the impact of those factors on
the perceived legitimacy of each of the military operations.
Because these “institutions of interstate violence” matter for the
exercising of US power, therefore, American policymakers must attend
to intra-institutional political dynamics – which often include, as
Field-Marshal Slim lamented, the domestic political considerations of
institution members. Frustrating as it may be, she argues, alliances and
coalitions are, in effect, strategic multipliers. As a result, the US has an
interest in maintaining them to its own benefit.
There is, however, a catch: the more dependent the United States
becomes on coalition warfare, the greater its “alliance security dilemma”
becomes: American policymakers are torn between fears of entrapment
– constraints on America’s freedom of action imposed by the necessity
of satisfying allies – and the fear of abandonment – the risk, in fact, the
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United States will have to go it alone. Weitsman shows balancing those
fears often leads to the creation of complex, overlapping, and inefficient
command-and-control relationships which actually diminish military
effectiveness. Given the increasingly powerful constraint of global
public opinion on military action, maintaining legitimacy has in effect
become a key strategic objective in any use of American military force.
Weitsman notes, for example, negative European public opinion over
the conduct of operations in Afghanistan became a critical problem for
American policymakers; she suggests accepting the political costs and
limitations imposed by coalitions has become a critical part of the new
American way of war.
Waging War offers important insights into the strategic benefits the
United States derives from the web of global coalitions it has created
since World War II and into the political and operational costs attendant
to maintaining them.
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Insurgency & Counterinsurgency
The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency
By Jeffrey Moore
Reviewed by Marina Miron, Assistant Editor with Infinity Journal and PhD
Candidate at the Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South
Wales Canberra

R

ecently, the concepts of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency
(COIN) have gained attention in academic and military circles.
Among the works devoted to counterinsurgency are those concerned
with the various campaigns in Southeast Asia. However, certain regional
conflicts, in Thailand, for instance, are understudied. With his book,
The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency, Jeffrey Moore seeks to fill this gap.
He believes his study provides useful insight for American and Thai
practitioners of counterinsurgency and shows Thailand, albeit slowly
and through trial and error, has gained valuable experience conducting
counterinsurgency campaigns. The Thai successfully defeated two major
insurgencies in recent years: the countrywide communist insurgency
of 1965-1985, and the southern border insurgency from 1980-1998.
However, since 2004, the country has suffered from a Pattani separatist insurgency in the southern part of the country. In addition, Moore’s
study aims to provide an examination of Thai national security issues
and related decision-making on a broader front. Most controversially
perhaps, the author claims his book can explain how to conduct COIN
on strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
One of the most interesting aspects of the book is Moore’s framework of analysis called, “COIN Pantheon.” It uses the same three
pillars of counterinsurgency – political, security, and economic – which
Australian counterinsurgency theorist, David Kilcullen, uses to support
his own triptych. Kilcullen’s pillars are supported by a platform of information and are topped off by a roof denoting control. Moore’s pantheon
differs from Kilcullen’s as his base is strategy and coordination, while
his three pillars of political, security, and economics are covered by an
additional layer called insurgent capabilities and intentions. The roof of
the pantheon, rather than being control, is made up of “at-risk population” (xviii-xxii). Thus, Moore’s main emphasis for achieving success in
any counterinsurgency campaign falls upon the strategic dimension and
the coordination that should be aimed at winning over the indigenous
at-risk population. Additionally, Moore employs David Galula’s and
Robert Thompson’s basic counterinsurgency tenets as supplementary
analytical filters – as he calls them – to illustrate how “the Thai organize
for and wage COIN.” (xx)
Moore emphasizes the importance of strategic dimension in counterinsurgency, which enriches his analysis given that he looks beyond
operational and tactical levels in order to understand how counterinsurgency functions. As part of this approach, Moore follows the
population-centric tradition of Galula and Thompson regarding winning-over populations as the ultimate prize. What is implicit in Moore’s
analysis is, similar to Kilcullen, he assumes support of the population is
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paramount for insurgent survival and it should also attract the attention
of the counter-insurgent. Moore also notes, despite his emphasis on the
population, that one should not underplay the centrality of kinetic operations. As the author asserts “[k]inetic operations were a close second in
importance” (73) to psychological operations during the latter phase of
the Thai counterinsurgency campaign of 1980 against the communist
insurgents. Vital in that specific case, he argues, was the fact that such
kinetic operations were highly intelligence-driven.
At the end of each chapter, Moore applies his unique methodological framework to help explain outcomes. Despite the logical coherence
of his model, however, it is difficult to see how it helps in establishing
the Thai way of counterinsurgency and why he uses only Galula and
Thompson given the panoply of theorists from which he could have
drawn. This list includes the likes of Robert Bugeaud, Hubert Lyautey,
Charles E. Callwell, Roger Trinquier and Frank Kitson.
Moore’s conclusion offers a good summary of practices implemented by the Thai government(s) in the two past insurgencies and
in the ongoing one. Further, he proceeds with an evaluation of Thai
principles setting them against Galula’s and Thompson’s core tenets
(364-368). His findings suggest the Thai have violated two of Galula’s
principles: counterinsurgent forces should not imitate the insurgents;
and civilians, not the military, should take the primary lead in the
counterinsurgency effort. Despite Moore’s reservations, the Thai were
successful in their efforts. In the introduction, Moore stated the Thai
case would have valuable lessons for US COIN doctrine, yet he does not
explain which lessons are worth replicating. An elaboration would have
been a valuable addition to what is otherwise a rich, historical narrative
of Thai counterinsurgency.
Overall, this study – designed for readers familiar with counterinsurgency theory – is a significant contribution. Moore’s research is
thorough and he uses a large number of sources including many personal interviews. He provides us with an informative account that helps
us understand the peculiarities of the Thai way of counterinsurgency,
rather than instructing us on how to conduct such campaigns in the
future.

Cross-Cultural Competence For A Twenty-First-Century
Military: Culture, the Flipside of COIN
Edited By Robert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands
Reviewed by Colonel Robert M. Mundell, Chairman Department of Command
Leadership and Management, US Army War College

The Rowman & Littlefield
Publishing Group: Lanham,
MD, 2012
386 pages
$145.98

R

obert Greene Sands and Allison Greene-Sands, two leading scholars
on culture in the national defense community, in partnership with a
host of social and behavioral scientists and practitioners, provide a comprehensive and convincing analysis of the importance of cross-cultural
competence (3C) that transcends beyond advocating its counterinsurgency (COIN) specific benefit. In doing so, the authors demonstrate the
relevance of 3C given the human-centric and evolving nature of war and
conflict in the 21st century. Importantly, the book also provides insights
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cautioning against the notion of 3C as a niche and temporal capability
declining in value as the US military transitions from operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Accordingly, Cross-Cultural Competence for a Twenty-FirstCentury Military is a must read for military professionals and practitioners
responsible for delivering education and training programs designed
to develop the type of expert knowledge required to fight and win in
complex and ambiguous security environments. As defined in the book,
3C is the knowledge, skills, and affect/motivation that enables individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments. (19)
The book’s basic premise centers on three main factors validating
the importance of 3C education and training programs: uncertainty
and ambiguity in the international security environment will require
military forces to operate in any global region; US forces will most likely
operate in partnership with joint interagency, intergovernmental and
multi-national forces; and a decade of lessons learned from operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan codify the importance of 3C in understanding
and negotiating the complexities of conflict and war. Equally as important, the book identifies three impediments for advocating 3C moving
forward: the challenge of communicating 3C as something other than
an enabler; the reliance on sociology and behavioral science in support
of 3C research and the associated difficulty in describing tangible educational and training outcomes; and the tendency to pair 3C with regional
specific and language education training efforts, which can compel
decision makers into an either/or decision making paradigm. All three
impediments are important for decision makers to consider in an era of
fiscal constraint and uncertainty.
The book is arranged in five logically sequenced sections analyzing a
series of interrelated topics including the history and background of the
development of 3C as a concept, an examination of 3C developmental
models applicable across three military education levels (basic, intermediate, and advanced), strategies for 3C education and training programs,
on-going 3C research efforts, and useful ideas and concepts for applying
3C during operations in cross-cultural environments. All five sections
contain data and compelling stories demonstrating the value of 3C for
the military. Of note, chapters 6, 7, and 8 are particularly useful. These
three chapters provide firsthand accounts by practitioners applying their
experiences to discuss and describe how 3C is developed over time and
what is required to succeed in cross-cultural environments. Importantly,
all three chapters emphasize how the development of 3C is a lifelong
learning endeavor. Similarly, chapters 13, 14, and 15 provide thoughts
allowing military professionals to transition cultural training and education from a just in time based training and education methodology to
a more deliberate and enduring concept, enabling 3C to become firmly
rooted in military culture.
The single most relevant idea contained in the book, in the opinion
of this reviewer, centers on the importance of cross-cultural competence
in relation to critical thinking—a must for current and emerging senior
leaders. Specifically, the book notes the value of 3C in assisting senior
leaders in making a relevant shift in how they think about others and
themselves. All six 3C components, which are self-awareness, self-regulation, cultural learning, intercultural interaction, cultural perspective
taking and cultural reasoning enable this shift in thinking and allow
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senior leaders to apply competencies such as sense making, differentiating fact from inference, and suspending judgment in a way which allows
leaders to think differently.
While generally very useful, the book does have its drawbacks.
It is unnecessarily redundant in characterizing the complexity of the
current operating environment and its use of Iraq and Afghanistan to
emphasize the importance of culture. The vast preponderance of data
and examples in the book are primarily applicable at the tactical and
operational levels, and provide minimal strategic-level insights. Finally,
as with many documents and publications developed over the past
decade, the book continues to advocate for additional research to quantify the concept. The latter does not bode well for a military enterprise
habitually constrained by clearly defined and proven outcomes required
to justify resources in an era of fiscal constraint. Perhaps the insights
contained in this book will aid in overcoming this cultural impediment.

The Taliban: Afghanistan’s Most Lethal Insurgents
By Mark Silinsky
Reviewed by Yaniv Barzilai; US Diplomat and author of 102 Days of War –
How Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda & the Taliban Survived 2001

T
Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International (PSI)
Publishing, 2014
263 pages
$52.00

hirteen years into the longest war in American history, precious
little is known about the Taliban. Indeed, most Americans probably
could not identify Mullah Omar as the leader of the Taliban by name
or recognize him as one of America’s top enemies from the two grainy
pictures of him that exist in the public domain. The Taliban: Afghanistan’s
Most Lethal Insurgents, a part of the PSI Guide to Terrorists, Insurgents,
and Armed Groups series, seeks to fill that void. A 31-year veteran of
the defense intelligence community, Mark Silinsky has written a useful,
concise, and readable primer on the Taliban. The book is ambitious in
its scope. In less than 200 pages, Silinsky attempts to provide an account
of the history of the Taliban, tactics and strategy the Taliban employs
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the connections the Taliban maintains with
other militant organizations and foreign powers, and an overview of US
counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban. Scattered throughout the
book are short, vivid profiles of individuals who crossed paths with the
Taliban, adding color and personality to the narrative.
Perhaps the strongest aspect of The Taliban is the description of the
way the organization operates. Silinsky succinctly discusses the structure
and leadership of the Taliban, then explores how the Taliban uses violence, intimidation, and information operations to achieve its objectives.
He also compares the Taliban to a criminal organization and identifies
the various criminal activities it uses to support its operations. Experts
looking for new information on the Taliban are unlikely to discover it
in this book, but those who are less familiar with the Taliban and the
US war in Afghanistan will probably enjoy Silinsky’s accessible overview
of what he deems “Afghanistan’s most lethal insurgents.” Similarly, his
analysis, which is rooted within the framework of US counterinsurgency
doctrine, is familiar but thoughtful.
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According to the extensive notes section, Silinsky attributes most of
his information to news articles. While the information presented is not
necessarily wrong, other stronger and more reliable sources – including
extensive scholarly research and primary documents – exist that would
better support some of his claims. Perhaps for this reason, Silinsky
misses some nuances and is at times imprecise in his retelling of the
history of the Taliban.
Silinsky also leaves some of the most important questions unanswered, such as how the Taliban has changed since its rise to power,
the existence of moderate elements within the Taliban, the prospects
for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and the relative strength of the
Afghan National Security Forces. While each of these topics could merit
their own books, his extensive analytical experience put him in an ideal
position to discuss these critical issues further.
His final conclusion, the Taliban will ultimately lose the war because
of cruel and regressive tendencies, is appealing for Westerners but not
necessarily supported by historical facts. While most of the world may
share this hope, the Taliban’s first rise to power in the mid-1990s should
be a vivid reminder that barbarous insurgents have defeated their kinder,
morally superior opponents in the past.
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Ahmed
Rashid’s book entitled Taliban served as the handbook for soldiers and
intelligence officials on their way to war, as well as a guide for Americans
struggling to understand an obscure enemy in a distant land. Today,
Mark Silinsky’s The Taliban can serve a similar purpose. While America’s
role in the war is coming to an end, this book will be valuable to the
small contingent of soldiers and civilians deploying to Afghanistan as
well as Americans seeking answers after 13 years of war.

Adapting to Win: How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign
States
By Noriyuki Katagiri
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College

A

dapting to Win is written by Dr. Noriyuki Katagiri, a political scientist, who presently teaches at the Air War College. It is derived
from his 2010 dissertation “Evolving to Win: Sequencing Theory of
Extra-systemic Warfare” at the University of Pennsylvania. The book
represents over five years of research and study on this topical area and
benefits from a great deal of support, including fellowships – in both the
United States and Japan. As a result, the work is extensively researched,
tightly designed, and is both well written and innovative. It represents a
very polished product drawing upon the Correlates of War (COW) data
spanning the years 1816 to 2010.
The intent of the book is to present “…an alternative research
project to the mainstream body of security studies that until recently
been fixated on great power interstate conflict and civil wars” and “...to
enrich the policy-making community through the study of what lessons
powerful states can learn to fight foreign insurgencies (4). ” It focuses on
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the concept of “extrasystemic” wars, which are a blending of civil wars
in which “…a foreign government intervenes in a civil war on either
side (5).” The work proposes insurgents use conflict phase-sequencing
(conceptually derived from evolutionary biology and evident in revolutionary warfare) as they attempt to prevail in taking over a state.
Six models of extrasystemic war based on sequencing are evident.
Each model witnesses from one to three phases derived from conventional war, guerilla war, and state-building as the starting point. The first
four models (Conventional, Primitive, Degenerative, and Premature) are
quite common, only possess one or two stages, and typically fail. The last
two models (Maoist and Progressive—a Maoist variant) are rare, possess
all three stages, and typically see their insurgencies succeed. Table 3: Six
Models of Extrasystemic War (49) helps to highlight the various models
and phases. Not surprisingly, “The central argument of this book is that
insurgent groups are likely to defeat foreign states in war when they
achieve an orderly combination of three phases: state building, guerrilla war, and conventional war” (169) which is very Maoist-insurgency
oriented.
The work is divided into nine chapters: how insurgents fight and
defeat foreign states in war, origins and proliferation of sequencing, how
sequencing theory works, presentations of the six sequencing models
and case studies (the Conventional model—Dahomean war, 18901914, Primitive model—Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960, Degenerative
model—Iraq War, 2003-2011, Premature model—Anglo-Somali War,
1900-1920, Maoist model—Guinean War of Independence, 1963-1974,
and Progressive model—Indochina War, 1946-1954), and a conclusion.
Criticism of this work focuses solely on the COW data. The author
has done a phenomenal job of analyzing the data. But since data drive
analysis, their use is problematic from the perspective of the reviewer.
Nineteenth-century extrasystemic war data are given the same value as
contemporary data, which ignores the fact that the international environment is dynamic—not static—meaning the host environments in
which states exist dramatically change over time. Thus, the data value
of at least the first hundred extrasystemic wars should be questioned—
although Fig 3: “How extrasystemic wars change over time” (48) does
help to show which models are dominant over which periods, with the
once highly occurring Conventional model fading away by 1960.
Further, late twentieth-century extrasystemic wars with continuity
into the early 21st century have proven themselves very different from
those of the past. These wars are represented by later #146-148 (COW
476-New data) case studies referring to Soviet-Afghan (1980-1989),
Somalia (1992-1995), and Iraq (2003-2011) along with other conflicts
not included in the work—Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq (post2010) and the cartels in Mexico and Central America (which do not fit
the typical insurgency profile and may or may not be considered extrasystemic). These conflicts exist in a security environment in which the
illicit economy is pronounced, the Westphalian state system is under
increasing pressure, and the preferred non-state actor goal is to create
“other-than” nation-state organizational forms (eg. Caliphate or narco
rule). Thus, they are “historically dissociative” from earlier insurgency
types and in variance with most of the COW extrasystemic war listings.
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In summation, this a superb and innovative work on historical
“insurgency phase sequencing” utilizing the COW data. The question
scholars, policymakers, and practitioners must ask themselves, however,
is how much of data are out of synchronization with twenty-first century
insurgency? The more it is, of course, the more the concluding analysis presented in this work must be considered with a critical eye. Still,
some of the work’s major policy suggestions—such as “…consider[ing]
wartime evolution of enemies as a central part of its strategy making
in future engagements in irregular war” (175) and curbing insurgent
evolution by denying them weapons, and creating a rival political
structure (175)—are inherently sound. This leaves us with a bit of a
conundrum as to the lessons of this work, which will ultimately come
down to one’s confidence in the utility of the COW data. What cannot
be denied, however, is the sequencing theory may also have potential
for utility in other areas of security studies. It would, therefore, be wise
to keep abreast of Dr. Katagiri’s future work, and track his use of this
form of analysis as it matures and is applied to other internal security
phenomena.

182

Parameters 44(4) Winter 2014-15

War & Technology
Napalm: An American Biography
By Robert M. Neer
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor, Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, former Minerva Chair and
Distinguished Visiting Professor
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r. Robert Neer, an attorney and core lecturer in the History
Department at Columbia University, has written a splendid and
important book on the history—one could say the rise and fall—of the
incendiary weapon, napalm. The author’s specialization in twentieth and
twenty-first century US military power is evident in his writing of this
extremely well researched and balanced work. The term napalm initially
derived from “…the first two letters of naphthenate with the first fours
letters of palmitate,” (32) but later had no chemical meaning as the composition changed to a different metal-soap and gasoline-gel formula. The
fact scientists at Harvard in early World War II undertook the actual composition and weaponization of napalm, and Neer’s book was published
by a Harvard University Press, seems quite an appropriate way to close
the loop on this weaponry saga.
One might ask why a book on napalm is needed. Unbeknownst to
many readers, is the stark reality that the fire bombings of Japan in World
War II utilizing napalm filled incendiary devices caused far more urban
devastation and killed more of the Japanese populace than the dropping
of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagaski combined. Napalm also
represented a deadly workhorse weapon in the island fighting campaigns
against Japan and was commonly used against massed North Korean
and Chinese attacks in the Korean War, and against guerrillas and
infantry targets throughout the Vietnam War. This weapon also saw
earlier use in Europe in World War II, against northern urban targets in
the Korean War, and has been utilized in other regions throughout the
world. Hence napalm, representative of mass-produced industrial-age
weapons, played an incredibly important part in America’s past wars and
deserves to have its story told.
The work is divided into thematic sections entitled Hero, Soldier,
and Pariah along with a prologue and epilogue, and notes, acknowledgements, an index, and quite a few historical photos and drawings. Five
“hero” chapters exist and cover the need for development of napalm
through its use in the island fighting campaigns of World War II and into
the mass fire bombing of Japanese cities. The soldier theme comprises
four chapters focusing primarily on the use of napalm in Korea and
Vietnam along with the increasing criticism of its use in the later war as
its unpopularity rose at home. The “pariah” chapters are five in number
and chronicle how both US public and international views on napalm
have soured and view use of the weapon as tantamount to a war crime.
The many stories woven together and insights provided about the
development, history, and use of napalm are not only highly informative
but also provide a good read. A compressed weapons systems lifecycle
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from the entrepreneurial through the institutionalized and later the
satirized phases is readily evident: from Harvard tennis players fleeing
during the initial field test in July 1942 (entrepreneurial), the Island campaigns and later firebombing of Japan in 1943-1945, its use in the Korean
War in 1950-1952, and in Vietnam in 1963-1972 (institutionalized), and
the anti-napalm arms control movement that picked up synergy with
the infamous photo of a naked nine year old Vietnamese girl—Kim
Phúc—burned by napalm and the subsequent “Napalm Sticks to
Kids” cadence-song parody (1972), the surreal scenes from the movie
“Apocalypse Now” (1979) related to napalm use, and other negative
elements promoted by popular culture (satirized).
The book contains many gems of information including highlights
of the work of Harvard professor Louis Fieser and his team in developing napalm, the metrics behind testing napalm in both optimizing
its weaponization characteristics and its effectiveness in burning
down various forms of structures, and discussions and analyses of its
battlefield use from mid-World War II into the modern era. The early
ill-fated attempt to combine napalm with bats for delivery purposes is
also covered along with perspectives on international law and legitimate
forms of weaponry—including increased hostility to land mines and
cluster munitions—affecting what can now be used in early twenty-first
century warfare.
This reviewer very much agrees with the author’s contention that
no mention of this weapon should be made openly in this day and age
and “…napalm violates the spirit of contemporary civilization” (222).
Of course, various interpretations and exceptions to the III Protocol
of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CWC) still exist
concerning the use of incendiary weapons in civilian areas allowing
states some flexibility in the munitions that they deploy (222).
During its heyday, napalm was representative of an older style of
attrition-based warfare between competing sovereign states. For this
reason, Neer’s work should be considered both a biography of an important US borne-and-bred weapon as well as a commentary on how war
has changed over the last seven decades. In many ways, this time was a
much simpler and straightforward one, unlike what Army professionals
now face. Today’s world is one in which napalm—whose imagery and
effects do not play well on global news and social media—has become
politically toxic.
In summation, the work is highly readable and informative with
few flaws—the location of Pomona College where an anti-napalm sit-in
took place in 1967 was misidentified (131), for instance. The author
did a great job from the initial research through the book’s structure,
writing, and editing and has to be commended for his efforts. The
work has primary applicability for courses on strategic use of airpower
(Pacific theater), close air support (CAS) operations during World War
II through Vietnam, and the evolution of incendiary and flame weapons
from early “Greek fire,” fire pots, and flamethrowers into more modern
fuel-air and thermobaric weapons. It also provides us with numerous
vignettes into the human costs of war and insights into how contentious
the Vietnam era protests were. This book may have some secondary
utility for courses on changing perspectives on international law and
civil-military relations during times of national duress.
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Air Mobility: A Brief History of the American Experience
By Robert C. Owen
Reviewed by Jill Sargent Russell, Doctoral Candidate in War Studies, King’s
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hen people speak of the might of airpower, the first thought is
bombing. Save for nuclear weapons, however, the decisive influence of air-delivered destruction remains debatable. On the other hand,
remembering the term actually includes air mobility—transport and lift
by air—argues for that part of the capability to be considered a game
changer in warfare. Robert Owen’s Air Mobility: A Brief History of the
American Experience provides a narrative which makes this interpretation
compelling. His book intends a significant task, to recount the rise of a
pillar in 20th century American power within the framework of an age
which saw major changes in warfare. Opening with air mobility’s first
awkward steps which accelerate with its growth, maturation and emergence as a decisive force in war, Owen’s narrative covers many issues;
hardware, personnel and training, organisation and structure, tactics,
doctrine, strategy and politics, and the influence of wars all receive attention. Despite this complexity he weaves a sensible narrative from these
threads, effecting a comprehensive review of a long historical arc. What
he has written is a biography of a capability formed of a complex mix of
platforms servicing diversified missions through the fluxuations of rapid
development. This review focuses on the key elements—detail, narrative
methodology, and decisive points in the history that deserve highlighting—which shape the quality of the work and its place on a bookshelf
or in a syllabus.
Before moving on to the substance of the review, it is worth noting
the book is titled in a way that belies how engagingly written it is. Given
the dull caricature of a subject like logistics it would be unfortunate for
some to pass it by for its unassuming presence. In this age of hype,
Owen’s book under-promises on its cover and over-delivers in its
content.
Promised as a “brief history,” the narrative covers the critical
points in the trajectory of air mobility’s rise. This promise might be its
arguable flaw for, in brevity, the focus and detail must be constrained.
Nonetheless, in a book just over 300 pages it would be foolish to expect
such breadth or depth. It is entirely defensible to tell the story primarily
through the lens of the United States Air Force. Secondly, the work
must lack much of the detail of any given era or event. Despite these
limitations, Owen renders a sufficiently thorough story of air mobility’s
rise and one that is well-integrated with the greater 20th century history.
The history reads as a biography with a twist. Although roughly
chronological, the narrative proceeds as a series of vignettes critical to
the growth of air mobility. It is an engaging approach to a biography,
because individual chapters can stand nearly on their own, as with those
on the Berlin Crisis and the integration of air mobility and combat in
Vietnam. The first, recounting the standoff with Stalin over the fate
of Berlin, provides the substance behind a strategically effective act of
military symbolism, captured by the iconic image of “Airborne” Candy
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Bar Diplomacy for what it meant about the resolve and logistical might
of the allies. The second reveals the innovative application of rotary
lift in the Vietnam War to landpower’s advantages in battle, giving air
mobility its bite and shaping successive American military operations.
Other chapters explain how and why air mobility developed as it did.
To frame doctrinal developments that defined future capabilities, Owen
engages the Congressional military airlift hearings in 1960. Seemingly
relatively mild and prosaic events, they are rendered as the hammer and
anvil that shaped air mobility and warfare in later decades. Alternatively,
the contentious acquisition history of the C-17 highlights the complicated dynamics ruling the development of critical platforms. Withal, the
structure of this book engages the reader and serves its story well.
Finally, for what they reveal about military technological development, the first chapters on the infancy of air mobility beckon for further
scholarly attention. Chronicling the interaction between commercial,
civil service, and military activities in the emergence of the aircraft’s use
to move troops and materiel, Owen depicts the decisive role civilians
played in the early years of airborne lift. Such actors as the postal service
and commercial aviation were, in fact, the first to use aircraft to move
personnel and materiel when the military used this capability only as
support to aviation units. This multi-faceted relationship is important
for its role in air mobility’s story, but also for the questions and insights it
suggests for the contemporary era of technological transformation in the
military. This is a compelling case study, which should inspire inquiry
elsewhere in the history of military technology and development.
Finally, it is necessary to place this book for the reader. Among
thematic surveys like Marc Levinson’s The Box (2006), Owen’s work
rates highly, especially for bringing attention to a neglected corner of
military history. Considered in terms of biography, it works as the briefest sketch which provides the fullest picture, reminiscent of the virtues
of Mark Stoler on George Marshall, Soldier Statesman of the American Century
(1989). It is thus quite easy to hold it out to the military historian as
worthy for reading and classroom use, and I might further specifically
recommend it to the USAF as a necessary reminder of its full profile. A
better appreciation of air mobility might argue for it as the “King of Air
Battle,” which is not a half-bad achievement for a brief history.

The Unseen War: Allied Airpower and the Takedown of
Saddam Hussein
By Benjamin S. Lambeth
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army
Heritage and Education Center

A

fter describing the overwhelming 2003 campaign to topple Saddam
Hussein in Iraq, Stephen Budiansky closes his book Air Power
(2004) with this passage:
The great historical joke on airmen was that after having struggled for a
century to escape the battlefield in their quest for equal status and independence – having fought so many bitter battles to free themselves from
the indignity of providing “mere support” to ground forces – it was on the
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battlefield where air power finally achieved not merely equality, but its claim
to ascendancy.

That quote has caused very lively debates in classrooms at the Army
War College, and now Benjamin Lambeth has provided the most thorough evaluation available of airpower’s role in the 23 days of formal
conventional combat that began Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lambeth
is the most eloquent and enthusiastic writer on American airpower
today. Though published by Naval Institute Press, his study was initially
written for RAND under the sponsorship of US Air Forces Central
(AFCENT), known until 2009 as US Central Command Air Forces
(CENTAF). Lambeth does not claim quite as much as Budiansky, but
he does argue “counterland air attack has increasingly begun to move
doctrinally beyond solely the classic supporting roles of CAS (direct
support) and air interdiction (indirect support) toward missions that are
not intended just to support the friendly ground force, but rather to
destroy the enemy’s army directly and independently as the overall main
weight of effort.” (296) Readers who are prone to discount such assertions as USAF hype need to read Lambeth’s account and think seriously
about the implications of what he has to say.
While the beginning of OIF was “an all but flawless undertaking
by joint and combined forces” including not only land components
but indispensable contributions from “virtually the entire spectrum of
allied, air, maritime and space capabilities,” (4) Lambeth points out correctly the air campaign has been underreported in postwar accounts of
the march on Baghdad. This was not only due to the lack of embedded
reporters with air units, but also because the continuing violence in Iraq
quickly overshadowed the early successes. There was far more coverage
of air operations in 1991, with the long period of initial bombing before
the ground attack was launched.
Lambeth aims to fill the gaps, and does so admirably. He describes the
high-level planning in Washington and in headquarters at CENTCOM
and CENTAF. The initial “shock and awe” plan was modified by desires
to limit noncombatant casualties and to preserve infrastructure, and by
General Tommy Franks’ decision to attack early. That meant CENTAF’s
major air offensive started 28 hours after ground forces had begun their
advance and had overrun many areas. As a result, only 39 percent of
leadership or command and control targets initially scheduled for attack
would be struck during the three-week air campaign.
However, air power had already done much with both kinetic and
static operations to prepare the battlespace. Airmen in the No-Fly Zones
had already suppressed Iraqi air defenses and gathered a great deal of
valuable intelligence. After the full air campaign began on the night of
March 21st, the nonstop precision bombardment by ground and carrier
based aircraft “so resoundingly paved the way for allied ground forces
that the entrance of the latter into Baghdad was a virtual fait accompli.”
(127) Republican Guard units around the city lost over 1000 of their
2500 tanks before they were engaged by any ground elements. Losses
for other defending divisions were even more severe, severely reducing
possible resistance on every front.
Lambeth spends a chapter highlighting the biggest reasons for such
overwhelming success. These include improvements in air-ground

Book Reviews: War & Technology

187

coordination and force connectivity, more time-sensitive targeting
capability, better command and control, contributions from UAVs and
J-STARS, and better and more inertially-aided munitions. He is also
frank that Iraqi blunders and ineptitude helped. But there were still
some problems encountered. Fratricide still occurred, and the 11th
Attack Helicopter Regiment’s attempt at a deep attack failed miserably.
There were difficulties coordinating joint battlespace, especially with
Fire Support Coordination Lines, and some continuing shortfalls in
integration and information sharing. One persistent major deficiency is
the delayed process of Battle Damage Assessment, that not only lessens
our own ability to evaluate and follow up operations effectively, but also
gives our enemies time to control the flow of information concerning
raids.
This well documented and well written book deserves serious
consideration by anyone who desires to understand the current capabilities of American airpower and its role in modern war. Even as
Lambeth heralds a new era where the United States has finally mastered
high-intensity conventional warfare, he admits the same era also has
produced “a refined mode of fourth generation asymmetric warfare”
(309) to counter that preferred American methodology, and no acumen
in tactics or operations can make up for flawed strategy. His closing
comments, written against the backdrop of continuing strife in Iraq and
Afghanistan, are more somber than Budiansky’s. For Lambeth, the most
enduring lesson from OIF about modern warfare “surely must be that
even the most capable air weapon imaginable can never be more effective than the strategy it is intended to underwrite.” (311)

From Above: War, Violence, and Verticality
Edited by Peter Adey, Mark Whitehead, and Alison J. Williams
Reviewed by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Major General (USAF Retired)

F

or intellectual plebeians like your reviewer, any book with a made-foracademia word like “verticality” in its title might be a bit off-putting.
And, indeed, much or most of From Above is written for – and by –
academics. The majority of the predominantly British contributors are
professors of geography or the liberal arts. They are not specialists in
military or strategic matters.
It would be a mistake, however, for military professionals to dismiss
this volume because important chunks of it do, in fact, build the reader’s
intellectual database in a positive and insightful way. Moreover, it allows
those who do have expertise in related military or strategic matters the
opportunity to see how other thoughtful thinkers view their craft.
“Verticality,” it seems, is professor-speak to describe the aerial view.
According to the editors, this perspective has brought about “seismic
shifts” for “life on the ground.” They add that the book “makes significant moves to understand the view from above within the pathos and
passions of the societies that have produced and consume[d] it, perspective that art, literature and other forms of expression have been more
used to exploring.”
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Perhaps so, but the approach the editors took presents real challenges to creating a coherent narrative as there are, in addition to the
triumvirate of editors, thirteen different contributors, each of whom
penned separate chapters. Getting a baker’s dozen of academics to fit
into any sort of logical framework is no small task. In their effort to do
so, the editors divided the writings into three sections, respectively entitled “Science, Militarism and Distance;” “Aerial Aesthetics, Distortion
and the View from Below;” and “From the Close to the Remote.” Along
with an energetic - and editorially heroic - organizational effort in the
introduction, they sought to provide a context for chapters diverse not
just in subject matter, but in style - and verbosity - as well.
The results were mixed, and will likely mean readers will skim or
skip some chapters. For sure, a couple may be obtuse to all but the most
dedicated specialist. Others – such as one laboriously entitled “Project
Transparent Earth and the Autoscopy of Aerial Targeting: The Visual
Geopolitics of the Underground” – contain some nuggets but only if
one perseveres long enough to discover them.
Still, there are, however, a few gems. The chapter on balloons is
fascinating, tracing not just the technical development, but also with the
psychological impact the then never-before-experienced aerial perspectives had. The author highlights individuals who grasped the military
potential of verticality along with the contribution that ballooning made
to “militarized aeromobility.”
In his chapter, “Line of Decent,” Canadian Professor Derek
Gregory grapples not so much with verticality (though he sprinkles such
terms as “political technology of vision” and visuality”), but with the
whole notion of aerial attack and the risk to civilians by surveying such
operations from World War II bombings through drone operations in
contemporary conflicts. He does an able job trying to discern the propriety of an operator striking a target from a distance vis-à-vis the risk to
innocents on the ground, ultimately concluding – somewhat reluctantly
it seems – that “it is a mistake to turn distance into a moral absolute.”
Separate chapters address the idea of establishing and maintaining
sovereignty and control via aerial means in the Falklands and also in
colonial Iraq. The latter, while interesting, slides into a largely uninformed discussion of drone use in contemporary operations. Another
chapter with the attention-grabbing title of “Targeting Affective Life
from Above: Morale and Airpower” simply does not deliver much more
than a hostile assessment that might have been more effective if it was
better informed not just by the law of armed conflict, but also by a better
understanding of targeting in general.
Hostility towards the military instrument flavors the entire book.
For example, the much-anticipated chapter on drones is disappointing,
mainly because the contributor’s obvious disapproval of the technology
would lead the uninformed reader to think the aircraft were autonomous
weapons’ systems as opposed to ones under human control.
In fact, in more than one chapter, reference to “verticality” or the
“view from above” earns little more than a nod from the contributor
who will then write something that may only be tangentially related.
Thus, for example, a chapter entitled the “Scopic Regime of Rapid
Dominance” is more a critique – and a debatable one at that – of the
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Revolution in Military Affairs, the rise of precision weaponry, and
effects-based operations – than “verticality” per se.
The book is also burdened by dense and ponderous writing.
Consider this virtually unintelligible (to this reader anyway) passage
from the chapter on photomosaics (the process of matching individual
aerial photos to form a more comprehensive view):
According to this biaxial scheme, the vertical is the axis of order, paradigm,
symbolic function, disutility, unimpeded sightlines and disembodied omniscience, whereas to the horizontal belong disorder, syntagm, enunciative
function, utility, partial sight lines and exposure to visibility.

Whatever all that means. Sure, such language may be lucid to photomosaic experts, but in a volume which embraces such a broad range
of scientific and artistic disciplines, it is unlikely that more than a few
readers would.
In the end From Above does accomplish its mission in the sense that
the reader does come away convinced the “verticality” perspective is
fundamentally unique, and impacts perceptions of the ground environment more than one might think. Not for everyone’s bookshelf, but
an intriguing addition for the scholarly-inclined servicemember as it is
a quintessentially academic take on matters the military professional
might see very differently.
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The First & Second World Wars
Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914
By Adrian Gilbert
Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military Strategy
Plans & Operations, US Army War College
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New York, NY: Osprey
Publishing, 2012
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$25.95

hallenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914 by Adrian
Gilbert is a modern retelling of the experience of the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the opening months of the First World
War. Corresponding to the Centennial of the Great War, Gilbert wrote
the book to offer a “realistic assessment” of the BEF. Citing distortions
in the historic record, the author tried “to look afresh at the British Army
during 1914” by using first-person accounts and primary archival sources.
Challenge of Battle begins with an exciting account of the celebrated
Major Tom Bridges of the 4th Royal Dragoon Guards in Mons, Belgium
on August 21, 1914. The reader is given a gripping description of the
opening engagement of the war between the BEF and the Imperial
German Army. After this stirring introduction, Challenge of Battle provides
background to the BEF assembling in Great Britain and its movement
across France and Belgium. Filled with personal commentary from soldiers, this book provides an excellent feel to the general mood of the
BEF as it prepared to fight the German army.
After a brief description of the fighting near Mons, Belgium, Challenge
of Battle offers an interesting description of the tragic retreat of the BEF
in the face of overwhelming German force. This retreat is hampered
by poor coordination with the French army, a breakdown in command
and control, and lack of situational awareness. This situation, combined
with reliance on antiquated tactics, brings the BEF close to destruction
by the German army. After surviving the retreat, the BEF, together with
the French Army counterattack and force the Germans to dig in. Thus,
trench warfare becomes the defining feature of the Western Front for
the next four years.
Challenge of Battle lives up to the author’s desire to offer a fresh look at
the BEF. Without being revisionist, Adrian Gilbert provides the reader
an honest assessment of the BEF’s performance, leadership and tactics in
1914. The book concludes the BEF was hampered by lack of command
and control, outdated Napoleonic tactics, poor integration of artillery,
infantry, cavalry and aviation and the lack of an efficient noncommissioned officer corps. These issues alone could be fatal to an army, but
to compound the matter, its commander, Field Marshal John French,
did not trust his counterpart, French Fifth Army Commander, General
Charles Lanzerac. Adrian Gilbert says the result of this lack of trust
meant, “…both armies, although deployed side-by-side, would operate
and fight separately.” This situation nearly had catastrophic results for
the BEF, demonstrating that personal relationships matter more than
we often realize.
Although providing an excellent assessment of the BEF in 1914,
Challenge of Battle does have several areas of concern. Foremost is the
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inadequate use of German sources. One would expect a scholar to
approach this topic from multiple perspectives in order to offer a more
accurate history. There is perhaps no better way to offer a “fresh new
look” than to see what the adversary had to say about the BEF. Yet,
Gilbert uses few firsthand German sources. Also, there are virtually
no French sources; the reader is left to wonder what theFrench view of
the BEF was. Instead, we have merely the British view of the British
Expeditionary Force.
Another issue is Challenge of Battle rehashes some analysis from
Terrance Zuber’s book, The Mons Myth. This is problematic for serious
historians. Zuber has made a habit of claiming certain ideas or events
are myths that he, of course, debunks. His books have included, The
Moltke Myth and Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. The latter of these was written
with the idea that the Schlieffen Plan never existed (it did). Yet, some
of Zuber’s ideas related to Schlieffen have been rebuffed, bringing into
question his assertions on other topics. For more on this debate, see The
Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strateg y for World War
I, edited by Hans Ehlert, Michael Epkenhans, and Gerhard P. Gross.
English translation edited by David T. Zabecki, USA (Ret.)
With these concerns aside, Challenge of Battle is an interesting book
that offers a refreshing look at the performance of the BEF in 1914.
Adrian Gilbert strips away the sentimentality, without being revisionist,
and provides an excellent overview of the British Expeditionary Force
in the critical first few months of that catastrophic war. This book is a
welcome addition to those arriving during the Centennial commemoration of that terrible period of history.

Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe
By John Buckley
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, CRGT Research Analyst, U.S. Army
Heritage and Education Center (AHEC), US Army War College

T

his work on WW II appears very much revisionist, but it is not
truly some radical revelation. Rather, it restores balance in light of
previous, incomplete analyses and/or simplifications to the point of
simplistic. The specific issue concerns the generally negative assessments
of the British Liberation Army (BLA) in the Campaign in North West
Europe (NWE), 1944-45. The focus covers Field Marshal Bernard L.
Montgomery and mostly the British troops in 21st Army Group.
The Introduction in Chapter 1 begins with a sweeping review of
historiography from soon after war’s end to the present day. This array
of key WW II historians includes B. H. Liddell Hart, Max Hastings,
Carlo d’Este, Cornelius Ryan, Anthony Beevor, Robert Citino, and some
WW II films.
First, comparisons with their German counterparts have failed to
examine the entire picture. Some post-war German interrogations and
memoirs were attempts to demonstrate an apolitical distance from the
Nazi regime. Second, troop effectiveness came at heavy cost. SS units
exhibited great fanaticism. Compulsion in German units, when punishments could extend to entire families, not just the soldiers, attained
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serious levels. There does remain a question how the Germans had
institutionalized tactical skill so thoroughly, despite heavy casualties,
beyond fanaticism and fear. His dissection of the BLA leaves no such
open question.
He articulates quite definitively that the BLA was a drafted, citizen
army with much different government and attitudes, working towards
different operational, strategic, and policy goals. The challenge was
forging an effective military instrument to defeat Germany and retain
it as a bargaining chip of sorts for the post-war world. Chapter 2 thus
describes the army which Churchill launched across the Channel:
strengths, weaknesses, preparation, and training. This chapter is important to understand the military culture with its concepts, doctrine, and
techniques how best to wield the instrument. The BLA in June 1944 in
general was well trained, but largely inexperienced.
The remaining chapters describe the campaign chronologically.
Each one has considerable breadth and depth of carefully-explained
detail. Chapter 3 covers D-Day and the first weeks back on the continent. He believes that the complexity of pre-invasion planning did not
integrate the most-current intelligence, and unknown were certain 21st
Panzer Division deployments along the route for the rapid seizure of
Caen. Chapter 4 goes into the bloody fighting at Caen. Of particular
note is Montgomery’s major alteration to Operation Goodwood against
the intent of British 2nd Army commander Lt. Gen. Miles Dempsey.
Chapter 5 covers the ensuing, frustrating stalemate and reviews the
state of BLA tactics, techniques, and procedures. Chapter 6 analyzes
the breakout situation in late July which led to the British execution of
Operation Bluecoat and the ramifications for the famous Falaise Gap
later. Chapter 7 concerns the pursuit. It analyzes BLA capability and
capacity, among which the skills of the Royal Engineers (RE) figure
prominently, and aspects of the broad front or narrow thrust debate.
Buckley’s assessment of Operation Market-Garden in Chapter 8
believes the key question is how it came so close to success, since it
was “poorly conceived, ill considered, and deeply flawed” in higher-level
planning, giving due recognizance to Allied victory disease. His crux is
that the concept asked the BLA to accomplish a mission “for which it
was not mentally equipped.” He also addresses the issues of the degree
of German recovery, the operation’s air support writ large, and the relationship to Montgomery’s attempt for a “semi-independent strategy.”
Chapter 9 discusses the BLA’s depressing winter of 1944 under
adverse weather conditions. The main effort became the long-delayed
clearance of the Scheldt Estuary to open Antwerp. Buckley also explains
that the failure of Market-Garden to achieve a Rhine crossing still provided an active front. Chapter 10 covers multiple aspects of the Rhine
crossing to the end of the war, a period still full of action, as the BLA
fought on German soil.
This review can only highlight examples of Buckley’s meticulous
attention to detail. Continuous assessment explains how the BLA was
in fact a learning organization, albeit one which had given short shrift
to a unified army doctrine. The evolution of tank-infantry cooperation
rightfully receives a lot of attention, as does the reliance on a powerful
artillery and dominant air support. He also cites the development of a
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risk-averse culture. The analysis includes specific assessments of units
from division-level and below, including their evolution over time, as
well as veterans vs. green troops with appropriate statistical analysis of
available disciplinary, medical, and other data.
Despite extant biographies, there has been an historical tendency
to focus British actions in NWE on Montgomery. This assessment has
refreshing balance with meaningful discussion of 2nd Army’s Lt. Gen.
Miles Dempsey and VIII Corps’ Lt. Gen. Richard O’Connor, famed
tactical commander of Operation Compass in 1940 in the Western
Desert. A further look at short-lived 8th Army commander Lt. Gen Neil
Ritchie of XII Corps would have been welcome.
Monty’s Men is a must read. The level of nuanced and sophisticated
analysis is impressive. He assesses the breadth of evidence, both primary
and secondary, whether the good, the bad, or the ugly. Their juxtaposition and interaction were complex. Buckley places the tactical detail in
operational and strategic contexts. Finally, the perceived accomplishments and shortcomings of the BLA had major ramifications in the
immediate post-war period to create the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR) which supported NATO.

